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Abstract
Agents may commit a crime twice. The act is ineﬃcient so that the agents
are to be deterred. Even if an agent is law abiding, she may still commit the
act accidentally. The agents are wealth constrained. The government seeks
to minimize the probability of apprehension. If the beneﬁt from the crime is
small, the optimal sanction scheme is decreasing in the number of oﬀenses.
In contrast, if the beneﬁt is large, sanctions are increasing in the number of
oﬀenses. Increasing sanctions do not make the criminal track less attractive;
they make being being honest more attractive.
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Most legal systems punish repeat oﬀenders more severely for the same oﬀense
than non-repeat oﬀenders. Second-time oﬀenders, for example, receive more
severe punishment than ﬁrst-time oﬀenders. Penalty escalation characterizes
traditional crimes such as theft and murder, but also violations of environ-
mental and labor regulations, tax evasion, etc. This principle of escalating
sanctions based on oﬀense history is so widely accepted that it is embedded
in many penal codes and sentencing guidelines.
For the rather well developed law and economics literature on optimal
law enforcement escalating sanction schemes are a puzzle.1 This literature
looks for an eﬃciency-based rationale for such a practice. Does a sanction
scheme that maximizes welfare (deﬁned as the sum of individuals’ beneﬁts
minus the harm caused by their acts minus enforcement costs) indeed have
the property of sanctions increasing with oﬀense history? So far the results
have been mixed. At the very best the literature, which we describe at the
end of this introduction, has shown that under rather special circumstances
escalating penalty schemes may be optimal.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a new explanation for increasing
sanctions. We consider agents who choose whether or not to become crim-
inals. If they choose the criminal track, they commit the act twice. The
criminal market thus has a barrier to exit. An agent may join a criminal
organization engaging in smuggling; to evade taxes a person may accept an
illicit job; a ﬁrm may install a pollution abatement device that is not suf-
ﬁcient; a trucking company may accept a just-in-time shipment it can only
handle ignoring speed limits.
If the agents opt to be law abiding, they may still commit the act by
mistake in each period. A traveller may unknowingly not declare merchandize
at the customs; a taxpayer may want to give a true account of her earnings,
yet she may by mistake forget a source of income in her declaration; a ﬁrm
may accidentally pollute the environment; a driver may miss a speed limit
on the highway.
The act is ineﬃcient; the agents are thus to be deterred. The agents are
wealth constrained so that increasing the ﬁne for the ﬁrst oﬀense means a
1See, e.g., Garoupa (1997) or Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for surveys of this literature.
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government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension.
We ﬁnd that when the beneﬁt from the oﬀense is high, sanctions that
increase with oﬀense history are optimal; when the beneﬁt is low, decreasing
sanctions minimize enforcement costs. When the beneﬁt from the act is
high in relation to the agents’ wealth, a high probability of apprehension
is necessary to deter. With a high probability of apprehension, raising the
sanction for the second oﬀense at the expense of sanction for the ﬁrst oﬀense
makes being honest very attractive: the probability of committing the act
unintentionally twice is low. The government uses escalating sanctions not
to make being a criminal less attractive but to make being honest more
attractive.
When the beneﬁt from the act is low, a low probability of apprehension is
suﬃcient to deter. With a low probability of apprehension, raising the sanc-
tion for the ﬁrst oﬀense at the expense of the ﬁne for the second oﬀense makes
being a criminal less attractive: the probability of being apprehended once
is higher than being apprehended twice. The government uses decreasing
sanctions to make the criminal carrier less attractive.
The idea to take into account the fact that people commit crimes by
mistakes has been used by several authors to explain escalating penalties. For
example, Stigler (1970, pp. 528-29) argues “that the ﬁrst-time oﬀender may
have committed the oﬀense almost accidentally and (given any punishment)
with negligible probability of repetition, so heavy punishments (which have
substantial costs to the state) are unnecessary.” Similarly, Rubinstein (1979)
and Chu, Hu, and Huang (2000) explicitly consider the cost of erroneously
convicting innocent oﬀenders. In all these papers the optimality of escalating
penalties is driven by the cost of punishing unintentional oﬀenses. We do not
consider such a cost. In our set-up all oﬀenses, intentional and unintentional,
give rise to the same beneﬁts and harms and are ﬁned with the same amount.
Escalating sanctions may be optimal because they make obeying the law more
attractive.2
Let us now discuss the related literature in some more detail. In Ru-
binstein (1979) even if an agent abides by the law, she may commit the
2See Dana (2001) for a critical discussion of unintentional acts. In contrast, Posner
(1986, p. 207) argues that for any crime that involves an element of negligence or strict
liability there is a risk of accidental violation of the criminal law.
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not accidental ones. Rubinstein shows that in the inﬁnitely repeated game
an equilibrium exists where the government does not punish agents with a
“reasonable” criminal record and the agents refrain from deliberate oﬀenses.
Rubinstein (1980) considers a setup where an agent can commit two
crimes. A high penalty for the second crime is exogenously given. The
sanction for the ﬁrst crime may be lower than the sanction for the second
crime. Rubinstein shows that for any set of parameters there exists a utility
function such that deterrence is higher if the sanction for the ﬁrst crime is
lower than the sanction for the second crime. Rubinstein does not allow for
the second sanction to be lower than the ﬁrst one.
Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) develop a dynamic model with repeat
oﬀenses. Their concern is how prior oﬀenses should aﬀect the probability of
detection rather than the level of punishments.
In Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991) agents receive an acceptable as well as
an illicit gain from the criminal activity. The government cannot observe the
illicit gains. Repeat oﬀenses are, however, a signal of a high illicit gain. For
certain parameter values of the model it may be optimal to punish repeat
oﬀenders more severely.
In Burnovski and Safra (1994) agents decide ex ante on the optimal
number of crimes. They show that if the probability of detection is suﬃ-
ciently small, reducing the sanction on subsequent crimes while increasing
the penalty on previous crimes reduces the overall criminal activity. This
result is similar to our result when the beneﬁt and the probability of ap-
prehension are low. We also derive the optimal sanction scheme when the
probability of apprehension is high. Moreover, we derive the policy that
minimizes enforcement costs.
In Polinsky and Shavell (1998) agents live for two periods and can commit
a crime twice. The government observes the agent’s age and her criminal
record. They show that the following policy may be optimal: Young ﬁrst-
time oﬀenders and old second-time oﬀenders are penalized with the maximum
sanction. Old ﬁrst-time oﬀenders may be treated leniently. Accordingly, this
result does not say that repeat oﬀenders are punished more severely; old
ﬁrst-time oﬀenders may be punished less severely than old repeat- and young
ﬁrst-time oﬀenders.
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that may convict innocent oﬀenders. The government takes the possibility
of erroneous conviction as a social cost into account. The optimal penalty
scheme punishes repeat oﬀenders (slightly) more than ﬁrst-time oﬀenders.
Reducing the penalty for ﬁrst-time and increasing it slightly for repeat of-
fenders has no eﬀect on deterrence. The cost of erroneous convictions is,
however, reduced because the probability of repeated erroneous conviction is
lower than for ﬁrst-time mistakes.
Dana (2001) argues that contrary to the assumptions in the literature,
probabilities of detection increase for repeat oﬀenders. As a result, the opti-
mal deterrence model dictates declining, rather than escalating, penalties for
repeat oﬀenders. Taking the salience and optimism biases from behavioral
economics into account makes the case for declining penalties even stronger.
Baik and Kim (2001) extend Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991) by introduc-
ing the possibility of social learning of illicit gains between the two periods.
If social learning is more important than the inherent characteristics in in-
ducing oﬀenses, it may be optimal to punish ﬁrst-time oﬀenders as severely
as repeat oﬀenders.
Emons (2003) considers a similar set-up as we do here. There, however,
agents do not commit the act accidentally. Agents can choose more strategies
than they can in this paper; in particular, they can pick history-dependent
strategies. There we show that it is optimal to punish ﬁrst-time oﬀenders as
harshly as possible while the second oﬀense is not punished at all.
Emons (2004) asks the question whether the decreasing sanction scheme
of Emons (2003) is subgame-perfect. Does a rent-seeking government stick
to the decreasing sanction scheme once a crime has occurred? If the beneﬁt
and/or the harm from the crime are not too large, this is indeed the case;
otherwise, equal sanctions for both crimes are optimal.
In the next section we describe the model and derive our basic result.
Section 3 concludes.
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Consider a set of individuals who live for two periods. In each period the
agents can engage in an illegal activity, such as speeding, polluting the en-
vironment, or evading taxes. If an agent commits the act in either period,
she receives a monetary beneﬁt b>0. Yet the act causes a monetary harm
h>0t os o c i e t y .T h eh a r mh is suﬃciently higher than the beneﬁt b so that
the act is not socially desirable. The individuals are to be deterred from the
activity.3
To do so the government chooses sanctions. The government cannot tell
whether an agent is in the ﬁrst or second period of her life. The government
only observes whether the crime is the ﬁrst or the second one. Accord-
ingly, the government uses ﬁnes s1,s 2 ≥ 0w h e r es1 applies to ﬁrst-time and
s2 to second-time observed oﬀenders. Moreover, the government chooses a
probability of apprehension p. This probability is the same for ﬁrst- and
second-time oﬀenses.4 To save on notation we take p as a measure of the
enforcement cost. Since apprehension is costly, the government wishes to
minimize p.
Individuals are risk neutral and maximize expected income. They have
initial wealth W>0. Think of W as the value of the privately owned house
or assets with a long maturity. The agents hold on to their wealth over
both periods unless government interferes with sanctions. Any additional
income they receive in both periods, be it through legal or illegal activities,
is consumed immediately. Accordingly, all the government can conﬁscate
is W. If the ﬁne exceeds the agent’s wealth, she goes bankrupt and the
government seizes the remaining assets. This implies that the ﬁnes s1 and s2
have to satisfy the “budget constraint” s1 + s2 ≤ W.5
3We will give the exact condition as to the size of the harm later on. We assume that
the beneﬁts and the harms are the same for both crimes. If, say, the beneﬁt of the second
crime were much higher than the beneﬁt of the ﬁrst one, this might provide a rationale
for escalating penalties.
4We thus rule out the case where agents with a criminal record are more closely moni-
tored than agents without a record. See Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) for an analysis
of optimal detection probabilities.
5This assumption distinguishes our approach from Polinsky and Shavell (1998) who
work with a maximum per period sanction sm. Accordingly, they may set s1 = s2 = sm,
which is typically the optimal enforcement scheme. In their framework sm is like a per
5
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between the following two strategies:
• She can choose to be law abiding. This means that she does not commit
the act deliberately in both periods. She may, however, commit the
act accidentally. More speciﬁcally, in each period she may commit the
act by mistake with probability α ∈ (0,1). If she commits the act
accidentally, she receives the beneﬁt b and has to pay the sanctions if
apprehended. We call this strategy (0,0) which gives rise to utility
U(0,0) = W +2(1−α)α(b−ps1)+α
2[2b−ps1 −p((1−p)s1 +ps2)] =
W +2 α(b − ps1)+α
2p
2(s1 − s2).
With probability (1 − α)2 t h ea g e n td o e sn o tc o m m i tt h ea c ta ta l l .
With probability α(1−α) she commits the act in period 1 and not in 2
(or in period 2 and not in 1). In either case she receives the beneﬁt b;
with probability p she is apprehended and ﬁned s1. With probability α2
she commits the act twice. With probability p the agent has a criminal
record in the second period and thus is ﬁned s2; with probability (1−p)
she has no record and pays s1 if apprehended. This is the strategy we
wish to implement.
• The agent can choose to be a criminal. Then she commits the act
deliberately in both periods which we denote by (1,1). Being a criminal
generates utility
U(1,1) = W + b − ps1 + b − p((1 − p)s1 + ps2).
For both acts she receives the beneﬁt b. With probability p she is
apprehended for the ﬁrst crime and ﬁned s1. The second crime is
detected with probability p. With probability p the agent has a criminal
record in the second period and thus is ﬁned s2; with probability (1−p)
she has no record and pays s1 if apprehended.
period income which cannot be transferred into the next period. Burnovski and Safra
(1994) use the same budget constraint as we do.
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government indeed wants complete deterrence. Without any deterrence wel-
fare amounts to 2(b−h). Everybody commits the crime twice and there are no
enforcement costs. If the government completely deters with the maximum
enforcement cost of 1 (recall that we take the probability of apprehension p as
a measure of the enforcement cost), welfare is 2α(1−α)(b−h)+2α2(b−h)−1.
Accordingly, if 1 < 2(h−b)(1−(1−α)α−α2) the government wants complete
deterrence at any cost.
L e tu sn o wd e r i v es a n c t i o n st h a tg i v et h ea g e n t sp r o p e ri n c e n t i v e sn o tt o
become criminals. The agent is law abiding if U(1,1) ≤ U(0,0). Straight-












Accordingly, with all sanction schemes (s1,s 2) satisfying (1) the agent has
proper incentives and becomes no criminal. For example, the equal sanction
scheme s1 = s2 = b/p induces no crimes. So do the two corner solutions
(ˆ s1,0) = (2b/(2p −p2(1+α)),0) and (0, ˆ s2)=( 0 ,2b/(p2(1+α))). Note that
(ˆ s1,0) is decreasing and (0, ˆ s2) is increasing in the number of oﬀenses. Due
to the linearity of our problem the two corner solutions (ˆ s1,0) and (0, ˆ s2)a r e
of particular interest.
In a preliminary step let us check when, for given p and α,ˆ s1 ≥ ˆ s2. Once
we know this, minimizing enforcement costs while deterring individuals is
straightforward. Here we have
ˆ s1 =
2b
2p − p2(1 + α)






insert Figure 1 around here
Accordingly, for all combinations (α,p) in the shaded are of Figure 1 the
sanction ˆ s2 which deters all by itself is lower than the corresponding sanction
ˆ s1. To put it diﬀerently, in the shaded area ˆ s2 provides better deterrence than
ˆ s1. The intuition is as follows: Suppose we increase s2 by one at the expense
of s1. This exercise raises U(0,0) by 2α(p − αp2)a n dU(1,1) by 2(p − p2).
If p ≥ 1/(1 + α), the utility of obeying the law increases by more than the
utility of being a criminal. If p is suﬃciently high, the utility of a criminal
7
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as likely as for the ﬁrst act. The law abiding agent gains more from this
exercise because for her the probability of committing the act twice is lower
than committing the act only once. Only when α = 0, the law abiding agent
does not gain. Then we are in the scenario of Emons (2003); in this case
it is optimal to work with ˆ s1 only to make strategy (1,1) as unattractive as
possible.
Let us next tackle the task of minimizing the enforcement costs, as given
by p, while providing incentives not to commit any crime.6 Obviously,
Becker’s (1968) maximum ﬁne result applies here, meaning that in order
to minimize p the government will use the agent’s entire wealth for sanc-
tions.7 Combined with our preliminary result this implies that we will set
either s1 = W or s2 = W depending on which sanction provides better de-
terrence. This is a function of the probability of apprehension p which, in
turn, depends on the beneﬁt from the crime b: given the maximum ﬁne W,
p has to go up if b increases to maintain deterrence. Therefore, all we have
to do is to compute the beneﬁt b giving rise to the critical probability of
apprehension p =1 /(1 + α) when we optimally set ˆ s2 = W (or alternatively
ˆ s1 = W).8 This yields b = W/(2(1+α)). Accordingly, we have the following
Proposition:
i) If b<W / (2(1+α)), the optimal sanctions are s∗
1 = W and s∗
2 =0and
p∗ =1 /(1 + α) −

1/(1 + α)2 − 2b/W(1 + α);
ii) if b = W/(2(1 + α)), the optimal sanctions are s∗
1 ∈ [0,W] and s∗
2 =
W − s∗
1 and p∗ =1 /(1 + α);
iii) if b ∈ (W/(2(1 + α)),W(1 + α)/2], the optimal sanctions are s∗
1 =0
and s∗
2 = W and p∗ =

2b/W(1 + α);
iv) if b>W(1 + α)/2, deterrence is not possible.
We thus ﬁnd that when b is small the optimal sanction scheme sets
s∗
1 = W and s∗
2 = 0. First time oﬀenders are punished with the maxi-
6Since in our setup the harm of the crime exceeds its beneﬁt, maximizing social welfare
boils down to minimizing enforcement costs.
7If s1+s2 <W, sanctions can be raised and p lowered so as to keep deterrence constant.
8Stated diﬀerently, we minimize p subject to (1) and s1+s2 = W. Plugging the budget
constraint into (1) and diﬀerentiating the equality yields dp/ds1 =2 p(1−p(1+α))/(4b(1+
α)+2 s1 with dp/ds1 ≥ (<)0i fp ≥ (<)1 /(1 + α).
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When b = W/(2(1 + α)) and thus p∗ =1 /(1 + α) any combination of sanc-
tions is optimal. The government can, for example, choose equal sanctions
s∗
1 = s∗
2 = W/2. When b is large optimal sanctions are increasing in the num-
ber of oﬀenses; more speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst oﬀense comes for free and second
one is punished with the maximum penalty W.
We may summarize as follows. When the beneﬁt from the act is high in
relation to the agents’ wealth, a high probability of apprehension is necessary
to deter. With a high probability of apprehension raising s2 at the expense
of s1 makes being honest attractive because the probability of committing
the act twice accidentally is low. The government uses increasing sanctions
not to make being a criminal less attractive but to make being honest more
attractive.
When the beneﬁt from the act is low, a low probability of apprehension is
suﬃcient to deter. With a low probability of apprehension raising s1 at the
expense of s2 makes being a criminal less attractive because the probability
of being apprehended once is higher than being apprehended twice. The
government uses decreasing sanctions to make being a criminal less attractive.
What happens if α increases while b remains constant? The critical level
W/(2(1 + α)) goes down, making it more likely that b exceeds the critical
level. As errors become more common, escalating sanctions are more likely
to be optimal. Further note that p∗ goes down with α.I fα goes up, so does
U(0,0) while U(1,1) remains unchanged. Since being honest becomes more
attractive, a lower probability of apprehension is suﬃcient to deter.9
Our results may also be interpreted somewhat diﬀerently. Suppose the
government wants a high probability of apprehension p not to minimize en-
forcement costs but for, say, reasons of justice or due to political pressure.
Then our result implies that for given high p deterrence is higher with esca-
lating penalties. Next suppose the government decides to monitor ﬁrst time
oﬀenders more closely so that the probability of detecting the second crime is
higher than p. Then our result that increasing penalties may provide better
deterrence than decreasing sanctions still holds qualitatively. Accordingly,
escalating sanctions may be consistent with a higher probability of detection
9If we increase the number of crimes, our result that escalating sanctions are optimal
for high p still holds qualitatively.
9
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At this point it is important to stress that our results only hold because
our agents simply choose between obeying the law and becoming a crimi-
nal which, in turn, means committing the act twice. If we allow for more
strategies such as committing the act only in period one and then stop, or
only in period two, or in period in one and in period two only if not appre-
hended in period one etc., the picture is less clear-cut.10 Nevertheless, on
can easily think of situations where the choice is as simple as in our model,
e.g., an youngster contemplates joining a gang, a ﬁrm decides whether or not
to install a necessary pollution abatement device, a ﬁrm thinks about hiring
illegal immigrants etc.
3. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to give a rational for escalating penalties. When
the beneﬁt from the crime and thus the probability apprehension is low, cost
minimizing deterrence is decreasing; when the beneﬁt and the probability
of apprehension are high, sanctions are increasing in the number of oﬀenses.
Escalating penalties make both, the criminal and the law abiding agent better
oﬀ. Yet, with a high probability of apprehension the law abiding agent gains
relatively more from moving to increasing sanctions. Accordingly, escalating
penalties are used not to make the criminal career less attractive but to make
being honest more attractive.
An interesting topic for future research is to check whether penal codes
and sentencing guidelines indeed recommend the use of escalating sanctions
based on oﬀense history when the beneﬁt of crime and the probability of
apprehension are high.
10See Emons (2003, 2004) for an analysis with all these strategies, yet without uninten-
tional crimes.
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